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Resumo: No presente artigo, examinamos o elemento teológico do 
Yogasūtra e duas das mais recentes interpretações provocativas 
apresentadas sobre esse assunto. Considerando inicialmente alguns 
autores cujas obras foram consideradas de autoridade durante o século 
XX, discutimos suas opiniões críticas sobre o assunto. Depois de 
examinar as principais passagens nas quais a noção de īśvara aparece 
no Yogasūtra, analisamos duas leituras relativamente recentes do 
Yogasūtra que têm uma relação direta com a questão de como a 
introdução de īśvara por Patanjali deve ser entendida. Analisamos a 
posição de Maas, que, desenvolvendo uma hipótese originalmente 
apresentada por Bronkhorst, sugere que o Yogasūtra e o Yogabhāṣya 
de Vyāsa (juntos conhecidos como Pātañjalayogaśāstra) devem ser 
considerados como constituindo um todo unificado compilado e 
composto por um único autor, possivelmente Patañjali. Também 
levamos em consideração a tradução e o comentário de Bryant sobre 
o Yogasūtra, onde ele afirma que Patanjali era um devoto de um deus 
pessoal como Kṛṣṇa, e que sua noção de īśvara-praṇidhāna pode ser 
entendida como "devoção a Deus". Discutimos brevemente, 
finalmente, a compatibilidade mútua dessas interpretações. 
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Abstract: In the present paper we examine the theological element of 
the Yogasūtra and two of the newest provocative interpretations put 
forward about this issue. Considering initially a few authors whose 
works were regarded as authoritative during the XXth century, we 
discuss their critical opinions on the subject. After examining the 
main passages in which the notion of īśvara appears in the Yogasūtra, 
we analyse two relatively recent readings of the Yogasūtra that have 
a direct bearing on the question of how Patanjali’s introduction of 
īśvara should be understood. We analyse Maas’ possition, who, 
developing a hypotesis originally introduced by Bronkhorst, suggests 
that the Yogasūtra and Vyāsa’s Yogabhāṣya (together known as the 
Pātañjalayogaśāstra) should be taken as constituting a unified whole 
compiled and composed by a single author, possibly Patañjali. We 
also take into consideration Bryant’s translation and commentary on 
the Yogasūtra, where he asserts that Patanjali was a devotee of a 
personal god like Kṛṣṇa, and that his notion of īśvara-praṇidhāna can 
be understood as “devotion to God”. We briefly discuss, finally, the 
mutual compatibility of these interpretations. 
Key words: Yogasūtra, theology, īśvara, Yogabhāṣya 
 
 
 
GABRIEL MARTINO    
REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE FILOSOFIA DA RELIGIÃO / BRASÍLIA / V.5 N.2 / DEZ. 2018 / ISSN 2358-8284                        
DOSSIÊ FILOSOFIA ORIENTAL 
82 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Īśvara-praṇidhānād vā 
Or from the concentration (of the mind) in the Lord1 
  
 With just three words Patanjali manages to give rise to a heated dispute about 
what seems to be an important element in the system he is expounding.2 And he achieves 
this not only in relation to the successors of his own tradition but, what is even more 
remarkable, to people distant in time and space and also culturally and linguistically. 
What is the nature of the Lord (īśvara)? What does Patañjali mean with concentration 
(paraṇidhāna)? What is it exactly that arises from the concentration of the mind in the 
Lord? And as an alternative to what (vā) is this concentration presented? Maybe we can 
ask, before we begin our analysis, if inducing all these questions and the attempts to 
answer them might not have been part of Patañjali’s purpose with his cryptic and 
condensed sutric speech. We must have in mind that, according to our text, the study of 
sacred texts (svādhyāya), referring oneself to tradition (āgama) and the application of 
inference (anumāna) seem to be three of the necessary means to answer the questions just 
posed. Two of these (āgama, anumāna), as is known, are means for right knowledge 
(pramāṇa).3 The other one (svādhyāya), is one of the three constituents of kriyā-yoga, 
useful for weakening the kleśas (kleśatanūkaraṇa) and for bringing about samādhi 
(samādhibhāvana).4 It seems, thus, that Patañjali’s sharp stitch has fastened us not only 
to knowledge but also to the path towards samādhi, without us even noticing it.   
 In the present paper, however, we do not focus primarily on trying to answer all 
these questions. We examine critically, on the contrary, some of the interpretations that 
important scholars of the last century or so have put forward about Patañjali´s notion of 
Īśvara and the role it plays in the system. We also consider two relatively new 
contributions to this debate, those of Philip Maas and of Edwin Bryant which taken 
together can help us build a fresh and innovative understanding of the issue.  
 
1 YS I 23. 
2 For a gerenal introduction to the Yogasūtra and to its commentarial tradition, see Martino (2015: 429-
444). 
3 YS I 7. 
4 YS II 1. It is also one of the niyamas (YS II 32), together with Īśvarapraṇidhāna. 
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1. TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ROLE OF ĪŚVARA IN PĀTAÑJALA-YOGA  
Let us make reference, in the first place, to the German indologist Richard Garbe 
(1857-1927). In an article published in The Monist in the year 1894 with the title “Outlines 
of a History of Indian Philosophy” the author writes the following lines:  
At bottom, all that Patanjali did was to embellish the Sāṃkhya system with the Yoga 
practice, the mysterious powers, and the personal god; his chief aim had, no doubt, been 
to render this system acceptable to his fellow-countrymen by the eradication of its 
atheism. (GARBE, 1894, p. 588). 
 This passage contains a view that Andrew Nicholson has called a conventional 
wisdom clearly expressed by Garbe in the late nineteenth century and that can be found 
defended by scholars even in the early twenty-first. (NICHOLSON, 2010, p. 68). The 
German author considers that the “original” Sāṃkhya was atheistic and that Patañjali 
brings into it the notion of a deity in order to vanish this aspect of the system, which, as 
Garbe argues, was not acceptable to Patanjali´s orthodox contemporaries. The atheistic 
character of Sāṃkhya, as is known, is proper of the Sāṃkhyasūtra, a text believed to have 
been composed around the fifteenth century. There also seems to be other earlier 
references to the atheistic character of Sāṃkhya. Mādhava’s Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, for 
example, of the XIII-XIVth century, distinguishes between the Pātañjala-darśana which 
is a system of theistic Sāṃkhya philosophy, and the Sāṃkhya-darśana, identified with the 
view of Īśvarakṛṣṇa which, according to Mādhava, rejects God completely.5 In the eighth 
century, another doxographical work, the Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, written by Haribhadra, 
states that some followers of the Sāṃkhya darśana are atheists while others have īśvara 
as their deity.6 It is worth noting that neither of both doxographical works make reference 
to the theistic strand of Sāṃkhya as the Yoga-darśana. For these authors, Patañjali seems 
not to be the founder or expounder of a system different from Sāṃkhya. It took the word 
“Yoga” a long time to gain currency, as Bronkhorst has shown, as a synonym to 
Patañjali’s “Sāṃkhyan” philosophy. Mādhavasarasvatī's Sarvadarśanakaumudī (XIVth 
century), uses "Yoga" to denote this philosophy. Another example is Vijñānabhikṣu's 
Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya (XVIth century). (BRONKHORST, 1981, p. 315).  
 
5 SDS XIV-XV. 
6 Nicholson (2010, p. 182) suggests that the atheist followers of the Sāṃkhya alluded to by Haribhadra 
might be taken as “Sāṃkhyas without a creator god” while the theists would be “Sāṃkhyas with a creator 
od”.  
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 Apart from the works mentioned, however, ancient texts such as the Kaṭha and 
the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣads, the Bhagavad Gītā, the Mokṣadharma section of 
Mahābhārata XII, which include diverse expositions of Sāṃkhya, are thoroughly theistic.  
In fact, already in 1924 in his article about the meaning of Sāṃkhya and Yoga Edgerton 
asserted that the study of the epic and other early materials had convinced him that there 
was not a single passage in which the disbelief in Brahman or God was attributed to 
Sāṃkhya. “Where, then, -he asks- do we find that ‘original’ atheistic view expressed? I 
believe: nowhere.” (EDGERTON, 1924, p. 8).  
 On the other hand, as Nicholson has pointed out, the Bhāgavata Purāṇa includes 
a lengthy section that purports to be an account of Kapila, the founder of the Sāṃkhya 
school, who is depicted teaching a form of Sāṃkhya integrated with the practice of bhakti 
and with a Vedantic conception of Brahman (NICHOLSON, 2010, p. 169). Nicholson 
also suggests that the most influential commentary of the Sāṃkhyakārikā, the 
Tattvakaumudī of Vācaspati Miśra (Xth century), also implicitly accepts God 
(NICHOLSON, 2010, p. 174). It seems, argues the author, that the historians of 
philosophy interested in Sāṃkhya have focused on few texts7 of a more or less non- or a-
theistic framework, identifying them as authentic representatives of the school. This 
procedure, he adds, leaves out an enormous body of literature that claims to represent 
Sāṃkhya teachings and that is theistic in its outlook (NICHOLSON, 2010, p. 168).  
 Jonathan Dickstein has very recently carried out an interesting study that 
examines the contexts and possible motivations of Garbe’s interpretation of Sāṃkhya 
discussed in the previous paragraphs. He points out that although the influence of the 
German orientalist waned considerably in late twentieth century scholarship, his impact 
on the Western reception of Sāṃkhya has remained intact. “Sāṃkhya’s presupposed 
atheistic base, he says, has led to the continued trivialization and elimination of the 
theistic dimension of Sāṃkhya and especially of “classical” Yoga” (DICKSTEIN, 2015, 
pp. 3-33). 
 Later scholars have also found the notion of īśvara in the Yogasūtra a pain in the 
neck, improper of a coherent Yoga system.  Mircea Eliade, for example, in his Yoga, 
Immortality and Freedom holds that although it was Patañjali who introduced this new 
 
7 The Sāṃkhyakārikā, the Tattvasamāsasūtra, and the Sāṅkhyasūtra.  
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and “perfectly useless” element in the dialectic of the Sāṃkhya soteriological doctrine, he 
does not give īśvara the significance the late commentators will accord him. In the 
Yogasūtra, says Eliade, īśvara does not have the grandeur of the omnipotent Creator-God, 
neither the pathos that surrounds the dynamic and solemn God of other mystical schools.  
Īśvara is, at most, an archetype of the yogin, a macroyogin, which has only a minor role 
for the yogin who takes him as the object of his concentration. Patanjali’s introduction of 
God into Yoga, believes Eliade, occurred because īśvara was an “experiential datum”, 
since there was a “mystical” tradition of yoga in which the last stages of its practice were 
at least made easier by devotion, even though an extremely rarefied, “intellectual”, 
devotion to a God. (ELIADE, 2009 [1954], pp. 73 and ff.). 
 Frauwallner, on the other hand, in his two-volume History of Indian Philosophy 
asserts he must “shortly describe” a doctrine regarding a special peculiarity of the 
classical Yoga-system, “but which, in reality, represents only a later external supplement 
or addition to the system, viz. the doctrine of God.” Frauwallner holds, moreover, that 
this doctrine contains contradictions in relation to the basic views of the system, although 
he prefers to attach no weight to them, and states that the Godhead in the Yogasūtra “is 
dealt with as almost unemployed and idle”: “besides him (God), the entire course of the 
world unrolls independently.” He also claims that in the chief steps of the Yoga-way, God 
is not generally mentioned, that the devotion to God is mentioned as helpful only in a 
marginal manner, that it is only a means among other ones, and that it is in no way 
necessary. (FRAUWALLNER, 1973, pp. 334-335). Let us mention, as well, Feuerstein, 
who considers that the concept of īśvara fits ill into the dualistic system propounded by 
Patañjali, and that its inclusion might have met psychological rather than philosophical 
needs, or the diplomatic purpose of appeasing the authorities of mainstream Hinduism. 
(FEUERSTEIN, 1987, p. 391).  
 This kind of opinions have led recently a specialist like Lloyd Pflueger to believe 
that Patañjali condenses his theistic philosophical worldview in such a way that his 
complete theology must be derived from a total of eight aphorisms (PFLUEGER, 2005, 
p. 29). The “rather strange” concept of God in the philosophy of classical Yoga has led 
the author to explore it in a “fresh way from the sūtras themselves”, taking into 
consideration only the eight aphorisms he believes pertinent and with as much 
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independence as possible from the traditional commentaries which, he says, where 
written hundreds of years later (PFLUEGER, 2005, p. 31 and note 3).  
 As our exposition so far attempts to show, for more than a century, scholars have 
been troubled by and have discussed the (im)pertinence of īśvara in the ideological 
context of Pātañjala-yoga. Neglecting the theistic contexts in which Sāṃkhya expositions 
appear in ancient texts, historians have persistently interpreted the Yogasūtra in line with 
Garbe’s view, projecting over the text an atheistic proto-Sāṃkhya conception to which 
Patañjali would have added “his” strange and clumsy notion of īśvara. Cutting Patañjali 
out from the tradition he himself explicitly enrols in with his treatment of the notions of 
svādhyāya and āgama (and not less with īśvarapraṇidhāna), many scholars have tended 
to artificially read Patañjali as a new starting point, incriminating him for introducing a 
notion which already belonged to Sāṃkhyapravacana, so to say, and accusing him of 
poorly portraying his God because he didn’t include in his sūtras what the previous 
tradition had already said about īśvara. Specialist, as we mentioned, have also prefered 
to minimize the role of īśvara as a mere accessory, when a close reading of the sūtras 
shows that Patañjali includes the notion of concentration in the Lord in three different key 
moments that tightly tie up this practice with the attainment of samādhi. In what follows, 
let us briefly discuss this issue before dealing with two relatively new interpretations of 
our text.  
1.1  ĪŚVARA ACCORDING TO PATAÑJALI 
 It is known that Patañjali first introduces the notion of Īśvarapraṇidhāna in sūtra 
23 of the first book. As we cited above, the aphorism can be translated as “or from 
concentration in the Lord”.8  It has been discussed what is the other member of the 
disjunction (vā).9 There is some agreement, however, that the first part of the disjunction 
is found in the two previous sūtras where Patañjali explains that the nearness to the goal 
to be achieved10 depends on the intensity of the application of the yogi to the practice.11 
 
8 YS I 23. Īśvarapraṇidhānādvā 
9 R. S. Bhattacharya (1985) considers that the disjunction refers to sūtra I 12 (Cited by Bryant, 2009, p. 86 
note 129).  
10 Tola and Dragonetti (2006, p. 167), for example, understand that the goal referred to here is nirodha. 
Larson and Bhattacharya (2008, p. 164) consider that Patañjali refers to saṃprajñāta samādhi. 
11 YS I 21. Tīvrasaṃvegānāmāsannaḥ. Near for those with strong intensity. 
YS I 22. Mṛdumadhyādhimātratvāt tato’ pi viśeṣaḥ. Hence, a difference even arises from the fact that it is 
excessive, medium or mild.  
ISSUES CONCERNING THE THEOLOGICAL ELEMENT OF CLASSICAL YOGA PHILOSOPHY AND THEIR REASSESSMENT IN 
TWO CONTEMPORARY READINGS OF THE YOGASŪTRA  
 
REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE FILOSOFIA DA RELIGIÃO / BRASÍLIA / V.5 N.2 / DEZ. 2018 / ISSN 2358-8284                        
DOSSIÊ FILOSOFIA ORIENTAL 
87 
 
We can understand, hence, that the text is establishing that a difference arises from the 
fact that the application is mild, middle or extreme (s. 21, 22), or from concentration in 
the Lord (s. 23). Notice that Patañjali is neither putting in disjunction alternative practices 
nor alternative causes of the achievement of samādhi. He is just mentioning the possible 
origins from where the difference regarding the nearness (āsanna) of the goal arises.12 
Between those who are similarly devoted to the Lord the difference would arise from their 
degree of effort and application, but for those who are equally applicated, the difference 
is due to the concentration in the Lord. The nearness, thus, seems to depend on two 
different variables, effort and application, on the one hand, and  īśvarapraṇidhāna on the 
other, and the two can combine in various ways. 
 The next place where Patañjali introduces īśvarapraṇidhāna is in the first sūtra 
of the second book. Here it is stated that kriyā-yoga consists of austerity (tapas), study of 
sacred texts (svādhyāya) and concentration in the Lord. It must be noticed that there is no 
disjunction (vā) introduced here, and that Patañjali is not merely describing possible 
causes for a difference in the attainment of samādhi. He is enumerating the three practices 
that together are included in kriyā-yoga. We should remember, as well, that sūtra II 2 
states that the purpose of kriyā-yoga is to bring about samādhi and to make afflictions 
(kleśas) weaker.  
 The third place where īśvarapraṇidhāna is dealt with is in the exposition of 
aṣṭāṅga-yoga. In the description of the niyamas or observances, the second aṅga, 
Patañjali enumerates purity (śauca), contentment (santoṣa), austerity (tapas), study of 
sacred texts (svādhyāya) and, again, concentration in the Lord. In this new instance, 
Patañjali doesn’t make concentration in the Lord an option either, just as none of the other 
four niyamas is optional. Niyama, in its place, isn’t an optional aṅga of the aṣṭāṅga-yoga 
either, just as none of the other seven aṅgas are.  
 Our brief exam of the three instances in which Patañjali introduces the notion of 
concentration in the Lord has tried to show that they don’t seem to present this practice 
 
12 Notice that sūtra 22 is composed of a noun in the nominative case and a compound in the ablative case, 
while sūtra 23 only consists of a compound in the ablative case with the disjunction vā. The two compounds 
in the Ablative case, hence, can be understood as the two different causes for the difference (viśeṣa) of 
which Patañjali is talking about.  
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as a mere dispensable alternative.  Not more dispensable, at least, than any of the other 
disciplines with which it appears mentioned in the Yogasūtra. The notion is in fact 
included in the two different systematizations about yoga that Patañjali offers in the 
treatise: the yogāṅga and kriyā-yoga. Furthermore, when Patañjali dedicates one sūtra to 
each of the niyamas, in sūtra II 45 he states that from concentration in the Lord the 
perfection of samādhi arises. It must also be noticed that in the previous sūtra (II 44), 
when dealing with the niyama svādhyāya (the study of sacred texts), Patañjali says that 
from it the conjunction with the desired devatā arises. This connection between 
svādhyāya and īśvarapraṇidhāna is not only evidenced by their common presence in the 
two systematizations of yoga (as niyama in the aṣṭāṅga-yoga and in kriyā-yoga), but it is 
also explicitly stated in terms of an internal relationship between the two practices. If we 
accept, furthermore, that the terms devatā (II 44) and īśvara (II 45) refer to the same 
entity, the study of sacred texts leads to concentration in the Lord. This last conclusion 
reminds us of the narrowness of the approaches that restrict Patañjali’s theology to the 
wording in some of his sūtra and ignore the intertextual character of his work, which he 
makes explicit in his treatment of notions such as āgama and svādhyāya, closely related 
to īśvarapraṇidhāna, as we already stated. 
 
2. TWO NEW INTERPRETATIONS 
 Let us now turn to the already mentioned interpretations of Philipp Maas and 
Edwin Bryant. Philipp Maas, in the first place, has questioned the commonly assumed 
view that the Yogasūtra and the bhāṣya attributed to Vyāsa are two different works 
composed by two different authors. Following previous authors as Jacobi (1929: 584), 
Venkatarama Raghavan (1938-1939: 84) and Bronkhorst (1985: 203f.), he points out that 
there are a number of comparatively early primary Sanskrit sources, dating from the tenth 
century onwards, which contradict that common view. He mentions, in fact, different 
works that refer to bhāṣya passages as having been composed by Patanjali13 and asserts 
that all the authors he cites indicate that the Pātanjala-yoga-śāstra (i.e. the sūtra passages 
together with the bhāṣya part of the work) is a unified whole that was possibly composed 
 
13 Maas (2013, p. 57). “In all cases, we find citations of bhāṣya-passages ending with the statement iti 
patanjaliḥ”, says the author.  
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by one single author. In his doctoral thesis published in 2006, in which he carried out a 
critical edition of the first book of the Pātañjala-yoga-śāstra (PYŚ) he also provides 
further evidence for this hypothesis. After assessing the wording of the chapter colophons 
of the twenty-five manuscripts he had access to, he concludes that they indicate that the 
oldest reconstructable title of the work is Pātanjala-yoga-śāstra Sāṃkhya-pravacana, i.e. 
The authoritative exposition of yoga that originates from Patanjali, the mandatory 
Sāṃkhya teaching (pravacana). He further asserts that the references to the title 
Yogabhāṣya and to the name Vyāsa or Vedavyāsa as its author are only transmitted in a 
few manuscripts of limited stemmatic relevance.14 Originally, the work had neither the 
title Yoga-bhāṣya nor did it contain the personal name Vyāsa. He also points out that the 
Yogasūtra appears to have no manuscript transmission independent from that of the PYŚ, 
because the manuscripts of the Yogasūtra he had access to consist of extracts from the 
PYŚ only. Maas gathers, in sum, considerable and valuable evidence that supports his 
hypothesis according to which the Pātañjala-yoga-śāstra “is the result of a single, 
roughly datable philosophical authorial intention.” He also states that: 
The sūtra part taken for itself consists of 195 (or, in other versions, of 196) brief 
statements that in some cases are not even full sentences. Because of the brevity of these 
statements and because of the shortness of the sūtra part as a whole, the Yogasūtra cannot 
be interpreted convincingly without taking recourse to its historical and cultural contexts. 
(MAAS, 2013, pp. 69). 
 Moreover, Maas considers that “the text-immanent approach to the Yogasūtras 
was indeed used frequently to project anachronistic ideas upon this text.” (MAAS, 2013, 
pp. 69). 
 On the other hand, Edwin Bryant, in his thorough study, commentary and 
translation of the Yogasūtra, defends an interpretation according to which although 
Patañjali, like the Bhagavad Gītā, does not deny that the ātman can be attained by self-
effort, favors a theistic approach (BRYANT, 2009, p. 86). He points out that texts such 
as the Mahābhārata, the Gītā and later Upaniṣad indicate that īśvara was associated with 
a personal God. 
One would need compelling grounds, says Bryant, to renegotiate the meaning of the term 
(īśvara) as it is used and understood by the entire later philosophical tradition in general 
 
14 Prof. Ashok Aklujkar, who was present in the audience, pointed out to me the possibility of taking 
Vindhyavāsin as the author of the bhāṣya. Cfr. Larson – Bhattacharya (2008, pp. 40 ff.). 
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in the premodern period. The term cannot be extricated from its traditional context. 
(BRYANT, 2009, p. 86). 
 In accordance with this approach, the author asks “in Patañjali’s day and age, what 
options would there have been for any type of īśvara theism other than the 
Nārāyaṇa/Viṣṇu or Śiva-derived traditions?” (BRYANT, 2009, p. 92). “Patañjali’s 
system, concludes Bryant, can stem only from these preexisting Vaiṣṇava or Śaivite 
strains” (BRYANT, 2009, p. 94). Furthermore, the author argues that even though 
Patañjali never refers to Brahman in the sūtra, he consciously equates the Upaniṣadic 
Brahman with the personal īśvara by means of the common denominator oṃ introduced 
in sūtra I 27 (BRYANT, 2009, p. 106). The author’s general position, hence, considers 
that īśvara is the generic name for God in the Hindu theistic traditions and that when used 
alone like in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra it tends to refer to a philosophical category, that of a 
supreme creator God, rather than a specific divine manifestation of this supreme Being in 
the forms of Viṣṇu, Śiva and Kṛṣṇa, who all lay claim to the title īśvara in the Purāṇas 
and the epic texts. Factually, however, points the author, yogis over the past two millennia 
have been associated with these devotional sects and tend to interpret this category in 
terms of a specific chosen devatā and to add its name onto the oṃ mantra. (Bryant, 2009, 
p. 108). 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 Having thus briefly examined the main appearances of the notion of īśvara in the 
Yogasūtra and Maas’ and Bryant’s recent works that deal with this notion, we would like 
to conclude our exposition offering a few remarks about these new possibilities regarding 
the interpretation of Patañjali’s theology. The first element that should be analyzed is the 
compatibility of the two interpretations discussed. If Bryant’s reading is accurate, the 
bhāṣya part of the PYŚ –if we accept Maas hypothesis- should not contradict it. It can be 
pointed out, in this regard, that the commentary describes īśvarapraṇidhāna as a bhakti-
viśeṣa, a special kind of devotion (bhakti).15 This term clearly reminds us of the Bhagavad 
Gītā and its devotional milieu. In the commentary to the sūtra I 28, on the other hand, 
there is a quotation of the Viṣṇu Purāṇa, a very important text which contains different 
 
15 PYŚ I 23. 
ISSUES CONCERNING THE THEOLOGICAL ELEMENT OF CLASSICAL YOGA PHILOSOPHY AND THEIR REASSESSMENT IN 
TWO CONTEMPORARY READINGS OF THE YOGASŪTRA  
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stories about the avatars of God Viṣṇu and, especially, Kṛṣṇa. It is important to notice, as 
well, that the verse included from the Viṣṇu Purāṇa in the commentary to the sūtra which 
states that japa on the meaning of oṃ should be performed, includes the notion of 
svādhyāya. This reinforces the idea we suggested above which linked svādhyāya with 
īśvarapraṇidhāna and implies that īśvara has to be understood in the terms in which the 
sacred traditional texts available to Patañjali deal with it, and not in some autonomous 
patanjalian sense, as many scholars have contended.  
 These very few examples, we believe, are enough to give us a hint of the 
fruitfulness of reading the theological aspect of the Pātañjala-darśana taking as our 
starting points the interpretation of Maas regarding the Yogaśāstra and the stress that 
Bryant puts in the necessity of reading the Yogasūtra in its context. It should be the aim 
of a new investigation to carry out an interpretation of our text under these premises, in 
order to provide enlightening conclusions about this aspect of its content.  Our analysis 
also shows us that our knowledge of at least some aspects of Indian Philosophy still need 
some revisioning. We consider that there is much to be improved in terms of the 
methodologies we apply in our investigations and in terms of the presuppositions we 
project over the texts we read. But something seems even more urgent: there is still quite 
a lot of work to be done in terms of what the texts themselves that we study are, their 
unity, limits and their relation to their contexts. We can finally suggest that these latest 
endeavors of scholars of the twenty-first century are new ways of practicing svādhyāya 
or the study of sacred texts which, if they won’t take us to samādhi, at least will hopefully 
lead us to the correct knowledge of tradition.  
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